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Quantum states representing perfectly secure bits are always distillable
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It is proven that recently introduced states with perfectly secure bits of cryptographic key (private
states representing secure bit) [K. Horodecki et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 94, 160502 (2005)] as well
as its multipartite and higher dimension generalizations always represent distillable entanglement.
The corresponding lower bounds on distillable entanglement are provided. We also present a simple
alternative proof that for any bipartite quantum state entanglement cost is an upper bound on
distillable cryptographic key in bipartite scenario.
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I. INTRODUCTION
For a long time quantum cryptography with entangle-
ment discovered by Ekert [1] has been developed based on
pure quantum entanglement as a central resource. More
precisely the schemes (see Ref. [2]) existing in this do-
main were equivalent to entanglement distillation [3]. Re-
cently it has been shown that entanglement which is not
distillable (bound entanglement) can provide a quantum
cryptographic key [4]. This leads to a general scheme of
key distillation from quantum states [4, 5] with a private
state representing a secure bit (alternatively: a private
bit state or private bit) as an important notion. The
latter is a quantum state shared by Alice and Bob that
contains at least one bit of perfectly secure cryptographic
key. Quite nonintuitively, private bits can be approx-
imated arbitrary well by some bound entangled states
in some special sense: there exist a sequence of private
bits with dimension of their ”shield” part going to in-
finity and another sequence of bound entangled states
such that trace distance between elements of the two se-
quences goes to zero [4, 5]. Here we show that despite
of that fact any single private bit is distillable. Using lo-
cal filtering [6] in a way exploited in Ref. [7] we provide
a lower bound on the corresponding distillable entangle-
ment of d–dimensional private state (d-dimensional gen-
eralization of p-bit). Note that the special (bipartite)
case of our result has already found an important appli-
cation in a proof of unconditional cryptographic security
with small distillable entanglement [8]. Finally we give a
simple alternative proof that for any bipartite state en-
tanglement cost EC (see Refs. [9, 10]) is an upper bound
on amount of a distillable cryptographic key KD (usually
called distillable key). Originally this was proven [4, 5]
from the fact that regularized entropy of entanglement
E∞R is an upper bound for KD. We provide a simpler
version that does not need to refer to E∞R .
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II. LOWER BOUNDS ON DISTILLABILITY
A. Distillation of entanglement from private bits
For purely pedagogical reasons at the very beginning
we shall derive the lower bound on distillable entangle-
ment of private bits. This is the starting point for more
general classes of secure states as d–dimensional private
states and their multipartite counterparts.
Let us recall the definition of private bit [4, 5]. This is
the bipartite state with internal structure of both Alice
and Bob systems. It is defined on four-partite Hilbert
space HABA′B′ = HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HA′ ⊗ HB′ with subsys-
tems denoted by A and A′ (B and B′) belonging to Al-
ice (Bob). The first pair of subsystems shared by Alice
and Bob is of qubit structure, i.e., HAB = HA ⊗ HB ∼
C2 ⊗ C2, while the second one has in general the form
HA′B′ = HA′ ⊗HB′ ∼ CdA′ ⊗CdB′ . The explicit form of
private bit is
γ
(2)
ABA′B′ ≡ γ(2) =
1
2
1∑
i,j=0
|ii〉〈jj| ⊗ UiρA′B′U †j , (2.1)
where {|ij〉} is the standard two-qubit product basis in
HAB, ρA′B′ denotes some state acting on HA′B′ and Ui
(i = 0, 1) are some unitary operations. The structure of
private bit can be divided into two parts [5]. The first
one (AB) called key part is the one from which Alice and
Bob can get a bit of secure key after local measurements
in the standard bases. The second part (A′B′) is called
shield part (in the case of approximate private bits this
part in a sense ”defends” the key in system AB from
an eavesdropper in the asymptotic regime [5]). We must
stress that the private bit contains the perfectly secure
bit of key while it can be approximated by bound en-
tangled states in the sense that there exist a sequence of
private bits γ
(2)
k with the dimension of their shield parts
H(k)A′B′ going to infinity and another sequence of bound
entangled states ̺k such that for any ǫ there exist k such
that ||γ(2)k − ̺k|| ≤ ǫ. The latter has been proven to
imply that a bound entangled state can contain secure
bit up to arbitrary precision measured by ǫ in the sense
2that the eavesdropper information about the shared bit is
bounded by some continuous function of ǫ that vanishes
for ǫ = 0 (see Ref. [5]). In general one has a perfectly
secure bit (no Eve’s knowledge about the bit) for ǫ = 0,
i.e., when the observers share just a private bit. It turns
out that this exact case can never happen when the ob-
servers are given bound entanglement since, according to
main result of the present paper, a private bit is always
distillable.
Having reviewed the structure of γ(2), we can start a
description of distillation protocol. We define the follow-
ing parameter
η = max
∣∣∣〈e1| ⊗ 〈f1|U0ρA′B′U †1 |e2〉 ⊗ |f2〉
∣∣∣ , (2.2)
where the maximum is taken over all normalized product
vectors |e1〉 ⊗ |f1〉 and |e2〉 ⊗ |f2〉 belonging to HA′B′ .
One immediately infers that
η ≥ max
m,n=0,...,dA′−1
µ,ν=0,...,dB′−1
∣∣∣∣
[
U0ρA′B′U
†
1
]
mµ,nν
∣∣∣∣ > 0,
where strict positivity follows from the fact that the ma-
trix representation [U0ρA′B′U
†
1 ]mµ,nν of the nonzero op-
erator U0ρA′B′U
†
1 in standard basis {|ij〉} must have at
least one nonzero element. Let |e˜1〉 ⊗ |f˜1〉 and |e˜2〉 ⊗ |f˜2〉
be product vectors from HA′B′ for which the maximum
in (2.2) is achieved. Then we define numbers
as = 〈e˜s| ⊗ 〈f˜s|Us−1ρA′B′U †s−1|e˜s〉 ⊗ |f˜s〉 (s = 1, 2).
These numbers are always positive and the square root
of their product is bounded from below by η (see Ref.
[11]). Now we are in a position to show the distillability
of γ(2). Let us assume that a2 ≥ a1 > 0. Then we define
local operators:
VAA′ = |0〉〈0| ⊗ 〈e˜1|+
√
a1
a2
eiΘ|1〉〈1| ⊗ 〈e˜2|,
with
Θ = arg
[
〈e˜1| ⊗ 〈f˜1|U0ρA′B′U †1 |e˜2〉 ⊗ |f˜2〉
]
,
and
PBB′ = |0〉〈0| ⊗ 〈f˜1|+ |1〉〈1| ⊗ 〈f˜2|.
The above operators can be used in LOCC operation
of two-way type. The operation (called two-way local
filtering) produces with probability a1 > 0 the state:
̺ ≡ VAA′ ⊗ PBB′γ
(2)
ABA′B′V
†
AA′ ⊗ P †BB′
Tr
[
VAA′ ⊗ PBB′γ(2)ABA′B′V †AA′ ⊗ P †BB′
]
= p|Ψ+〉〈Ψ+|+ (1− p)|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|, (2.3)
with p = (1/2)(1+ η/
√
a1a2) and two Bell states |Ψ±〉 =
(1/
√
2)(|00〉 ± |11〉). Distillable entanglement of two-
element mixture of Bell states is known to be [12, 13]
ED(̺) = 1−H(p), whereH(p) = −p log p−(1−p) log(1−
p) and can be achieved in the so–called hashing pro-
tocol [13]. If a1 ≥ a2 one applies the same procedure
with only one modification, i.e., putting the local filter
WAA′ =
√
a2/a1e
−iΘVAA′ in place of VAA′ . The result-
ing state is equal to the same mixture of Bell states (2.3)
as in the previous case, but the probability of its pro-
duction is now a2. Combining these two observations we
have the lower bound on distillable entanglement of γ(2):
ED
(
γ(2)
) ≥ amax
[
1−H
(
1
2
+
η
2
√
a1a2
)]
, (2.4)
where the factor amax = max[a1, a2] is maximum of two
probabilities of production of the considered two-qubit
Bell states mixture. It should be emphasized that η > 0
and therefore the Shannon entropy in (2.4) is less than
one, which results in strict positivity of right–hand
side of (2.4). Thus a bipartite private bit is always a
distillable state.
B. Distillability of multipartite p-dits
Here we shall provide a generalization of the result
to any multipartite version of a bipartite d–dimensional
private state (hereafter denotes by γ
(d)
ABA′B′ or shortly
by γ(d)) [4, 5]. Multipartite d–dimensional private states
play a natural role in the generalized scheme of distilla-
tion of a secure key in a multipartite scenario [14]. As
mentioned, the special case of the present result, i.e., the
γ(d) one has already been applied in an unconditional
security proof with a small distillable entanglement [8].
A multipartite d–dimensional private state is a natural
generalization of the private bit (2.1) both in the ”size”
of the key part (increased for any local observer from
dimension 2 to d; this leads to log d of secure bits of
key [4]) and in the number of observers involved [14]:
from two observers Alice (AA′) and Bob (BB′) to N ones
{(A1A′1), (A2A′2), . . . , (ANA′N )}. It obviously reproduces
the bipartite d–dimensional private state [4] in case of
two observers. The form of multipartite (N -partite) d–
dimensional private state is
Γ
(d)
AA′
=
1
d
d−1∑
i,j=0
|i . . . i〉〈j . . . j| ⊗ Ui̺A′U †j ,
The above state is defined on a Hilbert space HAA′ =
HA ⊗ HA′ ≡ (HA1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ HAN ) ⊗ (HA′1 ⊗ . . . ⊗ HA′N ).
Here the system A = A1 . . . AN is of d
⊗N type (one has
N systems of d-level type instead of two systems of qubit
type) with the standard basis {|i1 . . . iN〉}. The density
matrix ̺A′
1
...A′
N
acting on a Hilbert space HA′ is respon-
sible for the shield part of Γ
(d)
AA′
and, as previously, Ui
(i = 0, . . . , d− 1) are certain unitary evolutions.
The distillation scheme may be found using similar
techniques as for private bits. Therefore for fixed i and
3j (i < j, i, j = 0, . . . , d− 1) let us define
η(ij) = max
∣∣∣〈f1| ⊗ . . .⊗ 〈fN |Ui̺A′U †j |g1〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |gN 〉
∣∣∣ ,
(2.5)
where maximum is taken over all product vectors from
HA′ . Similarly as in the private bit case we also define
a
(ij)
1 = 〈f˜ (ij)1 | ⊗ . . .⊗ 〈f˜ (ij)N |Ui̺A′U †i |f˜ (ij)1 〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |f˜ (ij)N 〉,
and
a
(ij)
2 = 〈g˜(ij)1 | ⊗ . . .⊗ 〈g˜(ij)N |Uj̺A′U †j |g˜(ij)1 〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |g˜(ij)N 〉
where |f˜ (ij)1 〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |f˜ (ij)N 〉 and |g˜(ij)1 〉 ⊗ . . . ⊗ |g˜(ij)N 〉 are
vectors realizing a maximum in Eq. (2.5). In a full anal-
ogy to the case of a private bit, one checks that (cf. [11])
0 < η(ij) ≤
√
a
(ij)
1 a
(ij)
2 . Again, if for a given pair of
indices {i, j} (i < j) one has a(ij)2 ≥ a(ij)1 > 0, we define
V
(ij)
A1A′1
= |i〉〈i| ⊗ 〈f˜ (ij)1 |+
√
a
(ij)
1 /a
(ij)
2 e
iΘij |j〉〈j| ⊗ 〈g˜(ij)1 |,
where
Θij = arg
[
〈f˜ (ij)1 | . . . 〈f˜ (ij)N |Ui̺A′U †j |g˜(ij)1 〉 . . . |g˜(ij)N 〉
]
,
while in the case a
(ij)
1 ≥ a(ij)2 > 0 we take W (ij)A1A′1 =√
a
(ij)
2 /a
(ij)
1 e
−iΘijV
(ij)
A1A′1
. Finally we introduce
P
(ij)
AkA′k
= |i〉〈i| ⊗ 〈f˜ (ij)k |+ |j〉〈j| ⊗ 〈g˜(ij)k | (k = 2, . . . , N).
In both cases for given i and j (i < j), we shall obtain
the same state but with different probabilities, a
(ij)
1 in the
first case and a
(ij)
2 in the second one. The corresponding
LOCC filtering performed by allN parties (the first party
uses V
(ij)
A1A′1
or W
(ij)
A1A′1
while all the others apply P
(ij)
AkA′k
in
full analogy to the formula (2.3)) finally gives the state
̺
(ij)
N = p
(ij)|Ψ˜(ij)+ 〉〈Ψ˜(ij)+ |+(1−p(ij))|Ψ˜(ij)− 〉〈Ψ˜(ij)− |, (2.6)
which is the mixture of two projectors onto GHZ states
|Ψ˜(ij)± 〉 = (1/
√
2)(|i . . . i〉±|j . . . j〉) with p(ij) = (1/2)[1+
η(ij)/(a
(1)
ij a
(2)
ij )
1/2
]
. Using the GHZ distillation hashing
protocol [15] (which is a generalization of that from [13])
and taking into account the fact that here one has only
the so–called phase error (corresponding to the sign ± in
the above formula) we get lower bound for the distillation
rate of the GHZ states from Γ
(d)
AA′
in the scenario with
chosen filtering corresponding to a fixed pair of indices
{i, j} as below
E
(ij)
D
(
Γ
(d)
AA′
) ≥ a(ij)max

1−H

1
2
+
η(ij)√
a
(ij)
1 a
(ij)
2



 ≡ E˜(ij)D
with a
(ij)
max being the bigger from two numbers a
(ij)
1 and
a
(ij)
2 . Again, since all η
(ij) are positive the above lower
bounds are strictly positive too, which results in distill-
ability of GHZ from any multipartite d–dimensional pri-
vate state. Since we can optimize over choices of {i, j}
we get the final lower bound on distillable entanglement
of Γ
(d)
AA′
ED
(
Γ
(d)
AA′
) ≥ max
i,j=0,...,d−1
(i<j)
E˜
(ij)
D ,
which again is strictly positive since, as previously
proven, all quantities E˜
(ij)
D are strictly positive.
The above protocols are working for any dimensions
d. However, for d ≥ 4, further generalization of effi-
ciency of distillation protocol can be introduced. This
is because all local projections are here two-dimensional.
It is easy to generalize the above scheme in such a way
that instead of single filtering of that type we perform
POVM involving k filterings (2k ≥ d) which are locally
orthogonal in the sense that their supports (subspaces on
which they give nonzero results) are disjoint. Each of the
results corresponding to kth result of POVM would pro-
duce some mixture of type (2.6). Such a scheme would
be, to some extent, analogous to distillation of entan-
glement from mixtures of locally orthogonal states [16]
which was independently analyzed also in [17].
III. BOUND ON DISTILLABLE KEY: AN
ALTERNATIVE PROOF
In this section we come back again to the bipartite
scenario. We bound from above the amount of a distil-
lable cryptographic key KD(̺) of any given state ̺ by
its entanglement cost EC(̺). This fact has already been
proven in Ref. [5] through the regularized relative en-
tropy of entanglement. The present proof has a more
direct character and is based on the well–known facts
from the theory of entanglement measures [10]. It also
exploits the special structure of the eigenvectors of the
bipartite d–dimensional private states.
The crucial role is played here by the asymptotic conti-
nuity of entanglement of formation [13] proved by Nielsen
[18] and the fact that the entanglement cost which has
a rather complicated definition (see [10]) may be related
to entanglement of formation in a simple way by [9]
EC(ρ) = lim
m→∞
EF (ρ
⊗m)
m
(3.7)
for any given state ρ. Moreover, for these two measures
we have E(Λ(ρ)) ≤ E(ρ) with Λ being some LOCC pro-
tocol [19].
At the very beginning we show that entanglement of
formation of γ
(d)
ABA′B′ [4] corresponding here just to bi-
partite version of Γ
(d)
AA′
with d being the dimension of HA
(equivalently HB), may be bounded from below by log d.
4This can be obtained simply by utilizing the definition
of entanglement of formation which for a given density
matrix ρ acting on the Hilbert space HA ⊗HB reads
EF (ρ) = min
{pi,|Ψi〉}
∑
i
piSvN (TrB|Ψi〉〈Ψi|) ,
where the minimum is taken over all ensembles {pi, |Ψi〉}
generating the state ρ and SvN stands for the von Neu-
mann entropy [20].
Consider now the state γ
(d)
ABA′B′ . One may easily see
that all its eigenvectors corresponding to nonzero eigen-
values are
|ψk〉 = 1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jj〉 ⊗ Uj |ϕ(A
′B′)
k 〉
=
1√
d
d−1∑
j=0
|jj〉 ⊗ |ϕ(A′B′)j,k 〉.
An arbitrary vector |Ψi〉 from any ensemble {pi, |Ψi〉} re-
alizing the considered state must be a linear combination
of the above eigenvectors |ψk〉. This is a consequence of
the fact, proved in Ref. [21], that the vector |Ψi〉 be-
longs to Ranγ(d), which in turn is a subspace spanned
by eigenvectors |ψk〉. Therefore it is not difficult to see
that |Ψi〉 = (1/
√
d)
∑d−1
j=0 |jj〉 ⊗ |ϕ˜(A
′B′)
j,k 〉 must hold for
some vectors |ϕ˜(A′B′)j,k 〉. Entanglement of formation of the
vector |Ψi〉 can be easily estimated
EF (|Ψi〉) = SvN
(
TrBB′ |Ψi〉〈Ψi|
)
=
=
1
d
∑
j
SvN
(
Ξ
(A′)
j,k
)
+ log d
≥ log d,
where Ξ
(A′)
j,k = TrB′ |ϕ˜(A
′B′)
j,k 〉〈ϕ˜(A
′B′)
j,k |. Since this holds
for any vector from any ensemble of γ(d), we have, by the
very definition of EF , the following
Property 1. For any p-dit state γ(d) one has
EF
(
γ(d)
) ≥ log d. (3.8)
Note by the way that, by inspection, one can see that
tensor product (γ(d))⊗m has a structure of γ(d
m) type.
Hence, a straightforward application of (3.7) to γ(d) in
place of ̺ together with the above inequality leads to a
stronger result, namely one has
Property 1a. For any p-dit state γ(d) one has:
EC
(
γ(d)
) ≥ log d.
Now we are in position to relate KD and EC . Suppose
that Alice and Bob share n copies of a given bipartite
state ̺ with KD(̺) > 0 (for states with KD(̺) = 0 the
inequality is trivially true). Consider the optimal proto-
col distilling KD(̺) secret bits from ̺ which is a sequence
of LOCC protocols Λn (n ∈ N) such that Λn
(
̺⊗n
)
= σ(n)
and ||σ(n) − γ(dn)||Tr ≤ ǫn for sequence of private states
γ(dn) with the key part AB defined on the Hilbert space
Cdn ⊗ Cdn . The sequence {ǫn} is supposed to converge
to zero with increasing n. Since the protocol is optimal
we have by definition [5] KD(̺) = limn(log dn/n).
On the other hand the asymptotic continuity of EF
together with its monotonicity under LOCC protocol im-
plies the following inequalities:
1
n
EF
(
γ(dn)
) ≤ 1
n
EF
(
σ(n)
)
+ cǫn log dn +
o(ǫn)
n
≤ 1
n
EF
(
̺⊗n
)
+ cǫn log dn +
o(ǫn)
n
for some constant c and o(ǫn) vanishing faster than ǫn in
the limit of large n. Combining this with (3.8) one has
log dn
n
≤ 1
n
EF
(
̺⊗n
)
+ cǫn
log dn
n
+
o(ǫn)
n
.
Taking the limit on both sides, utilizing Eq. (3.7), and
exploiting the fact that KD = limn(log dn/n), we get
finally the desired inequality that can be stated as follows
(see [4, 5] for alternative proof):
Property 2. For any bipartite state ̺
KD(̺) ≤ EC(̺).
This immediately implies KD(̺) ≤ EF (̺) since EF ma-
jorises EC .
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have proven that any d–dimensional private state,
i.e., state that contains log d bits of perfectly secure key
is distillable and we have provided the explicit LOCC op-
erations of distillation protocol. This result has already
been applied by other authors [8] in a proof of uncondi-
tional security with small distillable entanglement. We
have also provided the analogous result for a multipar-
tite version of d–dimensional private state which is a part
of general scheme for distillation of multipartite key [14].
The results imply immediately that although from bound
entanglement one can produce arbitrary secure bit of key
(Eve’s knowledge can be made arbitrarily small), the lat-
ter can never be perfectly secure (Eve’s knowledge can
not be made equal to zero). Finally exploiting the struc-
ture of eigenvectors of p-bits we have provided an ele-
mentary alternative proof of the fact that entanglement
cost is an upper bound on the amount of distillable key
of any quantum state.
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